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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CONFLICT OF LAWS-EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF STAT-
UTE MAKING INSURANCE COMPANY DIRECTLY LIABLE
FOR INSURED'S TORT
The case of Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co.*, recently de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Michigan, raises some questions as to
certain phases of the Conflict of Laws. In that case ,the plaintiff, a
resident of the state of Michigan, brought suit against the defendant
insurance company as sole defendant in the Michigan courts. Plaintiff
contended that he was injured in an automobile accident in the city of
Waukesha, Wisconsin, that occurred through the negligence of a cab
company in whose cab he was riding. The cab company carried motor
liability insurance in the Glens Falls Indemnity Company of Glen Falls,
New York, which company also carries on its business in the state
of Michigan and Wisconsin. An indemnity policy had been issued
to the alleged tort feasor in Wisconsin which by virtue of section 85.93
of Wisconsin Statutes creates a direct liability on the part of the insur-
ance company to the party injured through the negligence of the insured
named in the policy.' The plaintiff sought to recover his damages by
virtue of this policy and the Wisconsin statute which created a direct
liability to him on the part of the defendant insurance company. The
supreme court of Michigan, in upholding the trial court's order to
dismiss, held that in as much as Michigan statute specifically pro-
hibits the joining of an insurance company as a party defendant in
such a suit,2 the Wisconsin statute upon which rests the plaintiff's
right to sue the insurance company as sole defendant is contrary
to the public policy of the state of Michigan and will not be recog-
nized or enforced in the courts of Michigan. Not deciding the con-
troversy* between the plaintiff and the defendant as to whether the
Wisconsin law is procedural or substantive in character, the court
declared the right existed in the state of Michigan to refuse to
enforce such law of a foreign state regardless of it being substantive
or procedural in nature.
The ground upon which the Michigan court based its decision is
no doubt sound when considered in the light of the principles of
the Conflict of Laws. A tort committed in another state creates a
*24 N. W. 2d 547 (1946).
"Wis. Stat. (1945), 85.93 ACCIDENT INSURANCE, LIABILITY OF IN-
SURER. "Any. bond or policy of insurance covering liability to others by reason
of the operation of a motor vehicle shall be deemed and construed to contain
the following conditions: That the insurer shall be liable to the persons entitled
to recover for the death of any person, or for injury to person or property,
irrespective of whether such liability be in praesenti or contingent and to be-
come fixed or certain by final judgment against the insured, when caused by the
negligent operation, maintenance, use or defective construction of the vehicle




right of action that may be sued upon in a different state unless
public policy of the state of the forum forbids. This is no doubt
the rule which is most generally accepted in the United States. How-
ever, in those jurisdictions wherein the common law prevails the
above rule is not generally accepted, as for example in England
wherein the tort committed in the foreign jurisdiction must likewise
be a tort under the English law.3 However, as is pointed out in
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., some states have attempted a com-
promise between the rule generally accepted by the American states
and the rule as limited by the laws of England.4 The courts of such
jurisdictions have gone even further than the Michigan court and
the courts of the majority of American jurisdictions in placing public
policy as a bar to the enforcement of such a right and yet fall
short of the English extremity. These states require that -there be
between the law of the foreign jurisdiction wherein the tort was com-
mitted and the law of the forum state a substantial similarity. Thus
this rule would tend to limit recovery in the forum where, even
though not contrary to public policy, the right sued upon is not sup-
ported by a statute in the forum similar to the statute which con-
stitutes the basis of the right in the foreign jurisdiction. Justice
Cardozo maintains that this rule of 'substantial similarity' "has no
more stable foundation than misapprehended dictum in McDonald v.
Mallory" which case involved death on the high seas on a ship regis-
tered within a port of the forum state, New York.5 Justice Cardozo's
dissatisfaction with the rule of 'substantial similarity' is shared by
many cases.6
The grounds upon which a court may properly decline to enter-
tain jurisdiction in a suit based upon a right created by another
sovereign state are enumerated by Justice Veeder in Lauria v. E. I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co. Inc. as: that the action is penal; that it
contravenes some established and important policy of the state; that
the local judicial procedure is inadequate to do substantial justice in
the premises. 7 The determination as to the existence or non-existence
23 Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 12460, Stat. Ann. sec. 24.296 "In such original action
such insurance company or other insurer, shall not be made, or joined as a party
defendant, nor shall any reference whatever be made to such an insurance
company, or other insurer, or to the question of carrying of such insurance
during the course of trial."
3 6Halsbury, Laws of England, P. 248.
4 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
5 Supra, Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.; McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546 (1879).
6 Flash v. Conn., 109 U.S. 371, 3 Sup. Ct. 263, 27 L. Ed. 966 (1883). Texas & Pac.
R. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905, 36 L. Ed. 829 (1892) ; Barrows
v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 Sup. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964 (1898); Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Larussi, 161 Fed. 66 (1908); Burns v. Grand Rapids & I. R. R., 113 Ind.
169 (1888); Powell v. Great Northern Co., 102 Minn. 448, 113 N.W. 1017
(1907).7 Lauria v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 241 Fed. Rep. 687 (1917).
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of one of these qualifications as a reason for denying relief in the
state of the forum is in effect then the controlling decision as to
whether an extraterritorially created right will be enforced. While
recognizing the existence of such a right, the court need not enforce
it if it determines that one or the other, or all, of the qualifications
argue against its enforcement.
"There is grave danger, however, that the constant repitition
of such phrases (that a substantive right is transitory and fol-
lows the person wherever he may be) may induce the belief
that the application of the foreign law is imposed upon the
courts of the forum from without, when in truth the forum
acts in perfect independence according to its own notions of
what is right and proper.""
So also to the same effect, that the enforcing of a substantive right
created by a foreign jurisdiction rests, within proper limits, within
the discretion of the state wherein such right is attempted to be
enforced:
"A right having been created by the appropriate law, the
recognition of its existence should follow everywhere . . .
Though a foreign right must be recognized as existing, it
does not follow that it will be given any legal force .. .The
general principle is, that when a right has once been created
by the proper law it will be enforced everywhere, even where
it could not originally have been created upon the same facts.
And this is true, even if the right is against a citizen of the
state in which it is enforced.
But since the enforcement comes through the domestic law,
that law may refuse to give any effect to the right; and though
enforcement will not be denied merely because the creation of
the right is opposed to the domestic law, it will always be
denied where there would be anything illegal in the enforcement
itself. The law will not cause its own harm. Thus the enforce-
ment will be denied where the right was created abroad in
evasion or fraud of the domestic law, or where it is injurious
or of bad example or against the public policy or against
morality . ..
When a law of a foreign jurisdiction is enforced in the state of
the forum it must be remembered that it is not enforced because
of the existence of the foreign statute which does not extend ex
proprio vigore beyond the state which enacted it, but because that
right which was vested elsewhere legitimately belongs to the plain-
tiff and belongs to him wherever he might be.
"In all these cases the matter must, it seems, be determined
theoretically by the law governing the transaction, i.e., the
""The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws," 20 Columbia Law
Review 247 at P. 279.
9 Beale, Summary, Sec. 43, 48, 49.
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law of the place where the parties act in making their agree-
ment. If by the law their acts have no legal efficacy, then no
other state can give them greater effect. If by the law of that
state their acts created a binding obligation upon the parties,
then the parties who have acted under that law must be bound
by it . . .,10
While the subject matter under consideration in the article of which
the above quotation is a part was the question as to what law governs
the validity of a contract, (the intent of the parties; the law of the
place of the performance of the contract; or the law of the place
of the making of the contract) it does not appear to be an un-
warranted application to apply the reasoning which supports the
latter rule mentioned in support of the theory that a liability to a
third party beneficiary created by the law of the place of the making
of the contract should be enforced outside the jurisdiction wherein
the contract was entered into. That a plaintiff's right to sue an
insurance company as sole defendant under a liability policy is a
right vested against a third party within the terms of the contract
itself by virtue of sec. 85.93 of the Wisconsin statute is supported
by our own Wisconsin court. "It must be noted that the terms and
conditions of Sec. 85.93 Stats. are a part of the insurance policy
with like effect as though printed in the policy .. .11 Whether this
right is a substantive one or one of procedure is a problem which we
shall not discuss here but which has been considered in both the
states of Michigan and Wisconsin.1
In the Lieberthal case1 3 the dissent recognizes the right of dis-
cretion in the forum state to refuse to enforce a contract made in
and legal in another sate if the performance thereof in the jurisdic-
tion of the forum would be contrary to the law of the latter. However,
the dissenting justice maintains that where a substantive right is
vested elsewhere the state of the forum is bound to enforce it where
such action is not so violently repugnant to its public policy as to
effect its interests as a sovereign state. The dissenting chief justice
then, while in agreement with the majority opinion upon the prin-
ciple that the state of the forum controls the applcaition of the law
of the foreign jurisdiction, parts with the majority on the issue as
to whether the prohibition of the Michigan statutes, relating to the
joining of an insurance company as a defendant, constitutes a legis-
lative policy so strong as to prevent the enforcement of a substantive
10 23 Harvard Law Review 267.
SKujawa v. American Indemnity Co., 245 Wis. 361, 14 N.W. 2d 31, 151 A.L.R.
1113 (1944).12 Oertel v. Fidelity & C. Co., 214 Wis. 681, 251 N.W. 465 (1934); Clayton v.
Boesch, 315 Mich. 1, 23 N.W. 2d 134 (1946).
23Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., supra.
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right arising elsewhere on the basis of its contravening the public
policy of the state of Michigan. In view of the statutory provision',
and the numerous state decisions 5 which have deplored the insert-
ing of an insurance company's interest in the trial of a negligence
case, the majority opinion appears to have decided the question of
public policy on reasonable grounds and in accordance with the
general prin6iples enunciated in Re Estate Jacob Rahn:
"... which expression (public policy) must be looked for
and found in the Constitution, statutes, or judicial decisions of
the state or nation...,,16
The question as to whether uniformity in judicial administration
between the various American states based on comity should be of
greater consideration in suits involving rights arising out of laws of
one state but sued upon in another than should adherence to the
rules of Conflict of Laws is a question which is open for wide dis-
cussion. A pertinent point is made by Beale when he says :17
"These considerations would seem to indicate that the appli-
cation of the rule (that public policy can be a bar to a suit
based upon a right arising in another jurisdiction) of this sec-
tion should be extremely limited. This is especially true as
between the states of the United States, for not only is there
little or no variation in the fundamental policies of their re-
spective laws, but here, even more than elsewhere, a uniform
enforcement of right is greatly desirable."
CHARLES M. DALY
14 3 Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 12460, Stat. Ann. sec. 24.96, supra.
i5 Janse v. Haywood, 270 Mich. 632, 259 N.W. 347 (1935) ; Holman v. Cole, 242
Mich. 402, 218 N.W. 795 (1928) ; Dewey v. Perkins, 295 Mich. 611, 295 N.W.
333 (1940); Nicewander v. Diamond, 302 Mich. 239, 4 N.W. 2d 533 (1942).
16 Re Estate Jacob Rahn, 51 A.L.R. 877 as referred to in Phil. Law Journal, vol.
21 no. 4. "What Is Public Policy," P 158 at P. 161.
17 Beale, Summary, Sec. 612.1 at P. 1651.
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